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THE SECURITY–USABILITY TRADEOFF MYTH
GUEST EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION
The Security–Usability Tradeoff Myth
U sability problems are the root cause of many of today’s IT security incidents. Security mech-anisms are often too time consuming for people to bother with, or so complex that even 
those willing to use them make mistakes. For more than a decade, usable security researchers and 
practitioners have tried to address this problem by creating more usable security solutions. Retail-
ers, banks, and communications providers have learned that security that gets in the way of their 
customers is bad for business. Some organizations—especially those who were “born digital” and 
have a large customer base—have managed to increase security without impacting business, for 
instance, by introducing low-effort two-factor authentication and using the data they have to iden-
tify unusual behavior patterns. But researchers still identify a disconcerting number of security 
mechanisms today that induce mistakes or noncompliance, and ultimately put individuals and 
organizations at risk—or cause consumers to walk away. This not only damages digital business 
but also fosters the unhelpful perception among non–security experts that online security isn’t 
worth bothering with. As the value of digital transactions continues to increase, so will the number 
and sophistication of attacks—if the bank robber Willie Sutton Jr. were alive today, he would turn 
to cybercrime, because “that’s where the money is” now. To successfully defend digital business, 
we need to engage with consumers and offer them simple and effective security solutions.
This special issue of IEEE Security & Privacy features three articles and a roundtable discus-
sion that examine the relationship between security and usability in detail to identify the per-
ceptions, processes, and practices that underlie these continuing problems and to identify what 
needs to change to move the field forward. 
When we examine published usable security research to date, we find that most studies have 
been performed in laboratories with a limited number of participants (often students) who were 
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observed on one occasion using a security mechanism. 
Over the past few years, we’ve seen a growing number of 
studies in which hundreds or thousands of participants, 
recruited via crowdsourcing platforms. In these studies 
participants receive very small payments in return for 
interacting with a security mechanism and complet-
ing surveys. But they use the security mechanisms only 
once or twice, within a couple of days, in the context 
of a fictional task that isn’t 
their own and where 
their money or data 
isn’t at risk. There’s 
a lack of field studies 
in real environments 
to understand the 
impact that security 
mechanisms have 
on individuals and 
businesses. The article, “Secure and Usable Enterprise 
Authentication: Lessons from the Field,” by Mary Theo-
fanos and her colleagues, makes a notable contribution 
because it surveyed more than 30,000 employees of two 
US government departments on their day-to-day expe-
riences with two-factor authentication. The authors 
found that different implementations of the same 
two-factor technology produced significantly different 
experiences—reminding us that sometimes small dif-
ferences in implementation can make a big difference to 
those who have to use the security.
“Barriers to Usable Security? Three Organiza-
tional Case Studies,” by Deanna D. Caputo and her 
colleagues, reports on three software development 
organizations that wanted to provide usable security 
solutions. A multidisciplinary team interviewed devel-
opers, management, and security and usability experts 
who had been involved in the development of a certain 
product from each company. However, the research-
ers found no tangible evidence that the products were 
usable. The companies didn’t perform empirical or ana-
lytic usability testing and had no criteria or measure-
ments. Similarly, there was little or no formal security 
evaluation—and certainly no metrics. The interviews 
showed that many developers and security experts 
didn’t understand usability and its contribution to the 
business process. In the absence of formal testing and 
measurements, usability was mostly a grudge sale: it 
became a concern only when the company experienced 
significant problems, such as a drop in sales or a signifi-
cant rise in help-desk calls. 
Software-engineering research established 20 years 
ago that the later in the process you have to “fix” fun-
damental problems, the more expensive it will be to 
do so. But Caputo and her colleagues’ studies found 
that, nevertheless, the companies didn’t consider the 
requirement for security to work in the context of busi-
ness tasks upfront. Many security experts and devel-
opers in these studies invoked the security–usability 
tradeoff, which is insidious because it reinforces the 
perception that it’s not necessary to engage with users 
or to understand the tasks uses are engaged in. As Cor-
mac Herley points out in the roundtable discussion, 
“Debunking Security–Usability Tradeoff Myths,” this 
is “phon[ing] in” an excuse. 
Very few participants 
in Caputo and her 
colleagues’ studies 
had engaged suffi-
ciently with usability 
to realize it would 
increase security—
because if the secu-
rity is usable, users 
will do the security tasks, rather than ignore or circum-
vent them. 
As Herley points out, the insidiousness of the pur-
ported tradeoff is that, in the absence of measurements, 
it’s hard to disprove. The tendency has been to use any 
hypothetical reduction in security as an excuse for users 
have to bear the cross of workload and complexity that a 
security mechanism puts on them. The roundtable dis-
cussion, which also featured Heather Lipford and Kami 
Vaniea, revealed that this attitude squanders user atten-
tion and effort that will be needed as the number and 
sophistication of attacks increase. Vaniea points out that 
communication about risks and what consumers need 
to do needs improvement—for instance, users aren’t 
aware that software updates are key to security.
 Although usable security researchers see the value 
of engaging with end users when designing security 
mechanisms, many experts do not. It’s common for 
experts to believe that they know best and that users 
should invest whatever time and effort they believe is 
necessary. Vaniea offered this quote from a study con-
cerning the Windows 10’s update process: “the audacity 
of a user to question the opinion of the expert who put 
this update in there is shocking.” This kind of attitude is 
of course harmful and needs to be studied. We must find 
ways to help experts engage with users. 
A further and as yet unstudied area of usable security 
research is the mistakes made by experts. Many of the 
most catastrophic security incidents weren’t caused by 
consumers or employees, but by developers or admin-
istrators. Heartbleed and Shellshock were both caused 
by single developers and had global consequences. The 
recent Sony hack compromised an entire multinational 
IT infrastructure and misappropriated more than 100 
Tbytes of data—unnoticed. Fundamentally, every soft-
ware vulnerability and misconfigured system is caused 
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by developer or administrator mistakes, but very little 
research has studied the underlying causalities and pos-
sible mitigation strategies. A multitude of factors play 
into this problem. The first is the myth that experts 
are infallible. Similar to Anne Adams and M. Angela 
Sasse’s seminal work and call to action, “Users Are Not 
the Enemy,” we need to rethink our stance concerning 
experts and recognize that they too are only human and 
should receive as much if not more assistance than end 
users because their mistakes are just as natural but often 
more critical. 
The article “Developers Are Not the Enemy! The 
Need for Usable Security APIs,” by Matthew Green and 
Matthew Smith, explores this issue in the context of 
usability of cryptographic APIs. What makes this area 
of research particularly challenging is that it’s far harder 
to recruit experts for usability studies, compared to the 
relative ease in recruiting end users. Consequently, we 
haven’t seen many studies involving experts and this 
area remains largely unexplored, leaving many more 
myths to find and bust. 
T his is an exciting time for security research—a time to examine long-held beliefs about how 
to manage security. We need to use scientific research 
methods to put countermeasures that pass the test on 
sounder footing, and use measurements to check if we’re 
doing better or worse when we make changes. And of 
course, we need to be prepared to bury the beliefs that 
turn out to be incorrect. The security–usability tradeoff 
myth is only the first to bite the dust. 
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The IEEE Reliability Society (RS) is a technical society 
within the IEEE, which is the world’s leading professional 
association for the advancement of technology. The RS is 
engaged in the engineering disciplines of hardware, software, 
and human factors. Its focus on the broad aspects of reliability 
allows the RS to be seen as the IEEE Specialty Engineering 
organization. The IEEE Reliability Society is concerned with 
attaining and sustaining these design attributes throughout 
the total life cycle. The Reliability Society has the 
management, resources, and administrative and technical 
structures to develop and to provide technical information 
via publications, training, conferences, and technical 
library (IEEE Xplore) data to its members and the Specialty 
Engineering community. The IEEE Reliability Society has 28 
chapters and members in 60 countries worldwide. 
The Reliability Society is the IEEE professional society 
for Reliability Engineering, along with other Specialty 
Engineering disciplines. These disciplines are design 
engineering fields that apply scientific knowledge so that 
their specific attributes are designed into the system / 
product / device / process to assure that it will perform its 
intended function for the required duration within a given 
environment, including the ability to test and support 
it throughout its total life cycle. This is accomplished 
concurrently with other design disciplines by contributing 
to the planning and selection of the system architecture, 
design implementation, materials, processes, and 
components; followed by verifying the selections made by 
thorough analysis and test and then sustainment. 
Visit the IEEE Reliability Society website as it is the 
gateway to the many resources that the RS makes available 
to its members and others interested in the broad aspects of 
Reliability and Specialty Engineering.
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